In many areas of the legal system, parties are encouraged to settle their disputes without resorting to full-dress litigation. 1 Such compromises conserve judicial resources and provide faster, cheaper, and therefore more effective relief. 2 To facilitate compromise, courts ordinarily treat settlement agreements as binding and enforceable contracts.
a presumption of validity, and the burden of proving invalidity rests on the party asserting it. 6 Three Supreme Court decisions have shaped the treatment of patent settlement agreements within the confines of the statutory scheme just described. None has dealt directly with patent settlements.
A. Lear and Licensee Estoppel
For over a century, 17 the doctrine of licensee estoppel generally prevented a patent licensee from challenging the validity of a patent, 1 8 even if the license terms did not bar challenges, on the ground that he "should not be permitted to enjoy the benefit afforded by the agreement while simultaneously urging that the patent which forms the basis of the agreement is void." 1 9 In Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 20 the Supreme Court reconsidered the doctrine of licensee estoppel in light of its recent opinions stressing the public interest in free competition, 2 1 and abandoned it. 22 The Court also set aside a license term that would have required the licensee to pay royalties until the patent was finally declared invalid. 2 It did not decide, however, whether state contract law or federal patent law would govern with regard to royalties paid before the patent was misuse amounts to antitrust violation).
35 U.S.C. § 282 (1976).
1 See, e.g (1969) . While he was a Lear employee, Adkins applied for a patent on his improvements of gyroscope technology. He then negotiated an agreement with Lear that Lear would pay royalties for the use of Adkins's invention. The agreement gave Lear the right to terminate if no patent issued or if a patent was granted but subsequently held invalid. For several years Lear paid royalties; after 1957 it became convinced that no patent would ever issue and ceased making all but a small number of payments. In 1960 Adkins obtained his patent, and brought suit for the unpaid royalties and for royalties for the entire patent term, arguing that Lear's contractual agreement estopped it to challenge the validity of Adkins's patent.
21 Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964) ; Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234 (1964) .
12 395 U.S. at 668, 671. On this point the Court was unanimous.
'3 Id. at 671-74 (although Justice White, concurring in part, argued that this issue was not properly before the Court, id. at 682 & n.2).
granted. 24 One of the Court's major premises was that " [l] icensees may often be the only individuals with enough economic incentive to challenge the patentability of an inventor's discovery. If they are muzzled, the public may continually be required to pay tribute to would-be monopolists without need or justification. '25 
B. Aronson and the Reach of Lear
In Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 26 the designer of a key ring had contracted with a manufacturer to produce it. The contract called for one level of royalty payments while the patent application was pending and a lower level if the application was denied. Dealing only with the second part of the contract, 27 the Court enforced its terms. " [N] either the holding nor the rationale of Lear controls when no patent has issued, and no ideas have been withdrawn from public use."
28 The Court also reiterated its holding in Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp. 2 9 that federal patent law did not oust state trade secret law, even where the secret was an inherently patentable idea for which no patent protection was sought. 8 The Court thus limited the reach of Lear: it does not affect the availability of trade secret protection, and it does not apply to contractual arrangements where no patent ultimately issues. and authority of the courts and threatening res judicata principles., 1 The res judicata effect of patent consent decrees is subject to one important qualification, first stated thirty-five years ago in Addressograph-Multigraph Corp. v. Cooper.' 2 A consent decree of patent validity will be given res judicata effect only if it contains "either an adjudication of infringement or a grant of some relief from which infringement may be inferred.' ' 3 No additional limitations on the effect of consent decrees have arisen in response to the Supreme Court's decision in Lear. 44 Res judicata principles are not strictly applicable in the context of settlement agreements, because such agreements are not necessarily accompanied by a dismissal with prejudice. Yet these agreements do share some of the characteristics of a consent decree in that they bring an early end to costly litigation, and they are not clearly within the realm of ordinary contract law preempted by Lear. As a result, courts still are faced with a choice between the traditional encouragement of settlements and a patent exception of uncertain dimensions. No consistent approach is discernible. REv. 66 (1976) .) The parties to a consent decree therefore can bring new suits whenever there is a new cause of action, and strangers can make no use whatsoever of the judgment.
The Addressograph requirement is simply a means of guaranteeing that the process of determining which claims are to be merged or barred retains a certain integrity. It provides only a rough test, however: a recital of infringement does not automatically suggest that the issue of patent validity was hard-fought, because infringement liability can also be sham. Whatever doubts there are about the propriety of a particular consent decree, or about the scope of the cause of action, should be resolved by the judge who enters the consent decree rather than by the judge who is asked to give it res judicata effect in a later proceeding. 45 was one of the first settlement cases decided after Lear. At issue was the enforceability of a nocontest clause in a settlement entered into to avert threatened legal action. The Ninth Circuit treated the clause as "void on its face and unenforceable, '46 finding that "the recognized policy favoring settlement of disputes . . . must give way to the policy favoring free competition in ideas not meriting patent protection. ' 47 The court saw no point in distinguishing between initial licenses and settlements, noting that such a distinction would simply invite parties to couch licenses as settlements in order to avoid Lear. 48 The court might have pointed to several more specific factors in order to justify nonenforcement of the particular settlement agreement. First, it compromised threatened, not actual, litigation, 4 9 making it impossible for anyone but the parties themselves to know whether there was in fact any compromise. Second, the settlement agreement itself was suspicious: the infringer promised to cease his allegedly infringing activities, forego all challenges to patent validity, and pay $500 in liquidated damages.' Thus, despite its broad language, the Golden State court may have been worried about a sham settlement. The possibility that shams could be dealt with by a method less drastic than the one the court chose was not discussed in the case. There the patentee and a user of a device alleged to infringe the patent had entered into a settlement calling for the infringer to pay $70,000 over five years as "compensation" for past infringement.4 In a separate document, dated two weeks later, 5 " the patentee licensed the infringer to use the patented device in the future under the patentee's "customary terms and conditions. ' 5 Three years into the term 57 the licensee stopped making all payments, and the patentee sued for enforcement of the $70,000 portion of the agreement. The district court treated the separate documents as one patent license agreement, 5 8 and held it unenforceable under Lear and Golden State. 5 9 The Seventh Circuit reversed, treating the part of the agreement sued on as a binding agreement to pay damages for past infringement, given in consideration for the good-faith compromise of a bona fide claim. 6 0 Thus construed, the transaction lay outside the scope of Lear and within the policy of favoring "the expedient and orderly settlement of disputes and the fostering of judicial economy. ' 61 The Seventh Circuit may not have distorted the Ransburg transaction in order to avoid Lear problems, but the danger of exalting form over substance that inheres in the Ransburg approach is well illustrated in a Second Circuit decision. In International Telemeter Corp. v. Teleprompter Corp., 62 the court enforced an agreement that provided for $245,000, payable in installments, and a five-year royalty-free license. The court was willing to character- 
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ize the payment as "liquidated damages for past infringement and not a royalty payment for future use." 6 8 In addition to separating out enforceable components of settlement agreements, the courts apparently have relied on Lear to guide their interpretation of other settlement contract terms. In Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Allied Chemical Corp.," the parties to an infringement suit had entered into a settlement license containing a provision that the licensee would not terminate the arrangement for two years. The majority interpreted the provision to bar the licensee from defaulting on royalty payments, but not from bringing a declaratory judgment action within the two-year period.
6 5 Judge Timbers maintained in dissent that the clause was most naturally interpreted as a two-year ban on all challenges to patent validity. 6 8 In what was obviously a close case, Lear tipped the balance for the majority: "[I]f a settlement agreement contains an explicit prohibition on licensee suits during some future period, a court may feel that effect should be given to such provisions. However, the Lear decision militates against reading such provisions into a settlement agreement. The arguments marshalled in support of the result are curious. For example, the opinion asserts that settlement is "of particular value in patent litigation," because patent litigation is so time-consuming and complex. 9 But Lear had assumed that litigation was a necessary corrective in the patent system 7 0 and Blonder-Tongue had proposed to limit the undesirable features of patent suits by dispensing with repetitious litigation rather than by abbreviating individual lawsuits. 7 1 Lear, Judge Markey argued, did not "condone a kind of gamesmanship, wherein an alleged infringer, after employing the judicial system for months of discovery, negotiation and sparring, abandons its challenge to validity, executes a license in settlement, and then repudiates the license and seeks to start the fight all over again in the courts.
7 2 If the focus is on misuse of judicial resources, Lear did not condone, or even consider, the strategy. If the focus is on gamesmanship between the licensee and the patentee, Lear inevitably allowed it, because it permitted the licensee to challenge no matter what the license terms were or how long the licensee had acquiesced in them. Judge Markey's claim that Lear's anticompetitive concerns were not implicated because the patent in Aro exerted little, if any, monopoly power" 3 makes a distinction where Lear drew none. Lear's premise was that any invalid patent has the potential to earn undeserved monopoly returns, and that a licensing agreement under an invalid patent makes the potential abuse actual. The Aro court's premise is that only patents whose commercial value is above a certain unspecified minimum are worth bothering about. 7 4 Finally, the Sixth Circuit argued that not letting Allied Witan or its privies contest validity would not seriously inhibit challenges, because other licensees were available to take up the standard. 5 Again, the distinction is not one Lear makes: any licensee under Lear can challenge any patent at any time during the existence of the license.
Having decided the case before it, the Sixth Circuit then proposed a balancing test, to determine when settlements would be conclusive and when a settling party would be permitted to chal- 
lenge, notwithstanding the settlement. The courts should rely on "[e]vidence, not monopolophobia. ' 78 They should require the party who seeks to avoid the consequences of a settlement agreement to show that the patent "does in fact have the effect of a 'tax on the public,' is in fact a cause of increased pricing, is in fact serving to limit competition in its product line or does in fact exert substantial effect upon the public," and that "the proffered challenge is the only one likely to be made. including the Supreme Court itself, 80 to confine Lear elsewhere. Although it is difficult to put forward theoretical arguments for the enforcement of patent settlement agreements that do not apply with nearly equal force to patent licensing agreements, there are several practical reasons for establishing a clear rule enforcing patent settlement agreements, uncomplicated by the balancing that Judge Markey proposed in Aro.
As has been observed, a patent rewards inventors for their ideas only to the extent that they can enforce it2 1 The more frequently they must go to the courts to enforce their patents, the less valuable the patents are. Furthermore, it is far from clear that 83 But their effect depends on how the court reviewing the case interprets the Addressograph requirements." Moreover, the very availability of a consent decree may turn largely upon the temperament of the granting judge. On the one hand, a consent decree may be no more than an exercise in rubber stamping, subjected only to "perfunctory inspection accompanied by a hosanna because another case is off the calendar." 8 5 On the other hand, one court has stated that in deference to Lear it has "consistently... refused to sign consent decrees or judgments in patent cases containing a finding that the patent involved was valid or that it had been infringed by the defendant." ' Given the limits imposed on Lear in other contexts, the burdens a no-settlement rule would place on judicial resources, and the uncertain availability of consent decrees, Lear should not be s2 There are two distinct problems here. One is how to allocate responsibility between the Patent Office and the courts. Remarking on the "notorious difference between the standards applied by the Patent Office and by the courts," the Supreme Court thought that "the primary responsibility for sifting out unpatentable material lies in the Patent Office. To await litigation is--for all practical purposes-to debilitate the patent system." Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 18 (1966).
The second difficulty is that statistics about patent litigation are unreliable as a basis for judging its effectiveness. G. KOENIG Soc'y 164, 167 (1977) , points out that the ratio of adjudicated patents to patents subject to adjudication is so small as to make conclusions unreliable.
83 This result is foreshadowed in the District Court's opinion on the remand of WarnerJenkinson, where the judge reprimanded both parties for not having originally entered a consent decree or obtained a judgment with full res judicata effect. "While settlement of actions is to be encouraged, those which are but a temporary truce in the parties' continued warfare and present only the facade but not the reality of settlement should not be encouraged." 477 F. Supp. 371, 400 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) .
" fully extended to patent settlement agreements. This conclusion corresponds with the decisions of several lower federal courts that have, in effect, marked off settlement agreements from the broad sweep of the Lear doctrine, but these courts have not offered rules that provide sufficient predictability. The decisions of WarnerJenkinson and International Telemeter within the same circuit illustrate the problems with the current ad hoc approach. Even worse, the balancing test Judge Markey proposed in Aro-if it is taken seriously-injects into every settlement case a whole set of quasi-antitrust issues. It would be better to treat settlements as per se enforceable, and achieve a modicum of consistency, leaving to the Supreme Court or Congress87 the ultimate determination of how far-reaching the Lear assumptions should be. One qualification to a rule of per se enforceability is necessitated by the concern expressed in Golden State for the ease with which Lear can be circumvented by licenses masquerading as settlements. A rule that makes enforceable only settlements entered into to compromise actual, as opposed to threatened, litigation would exclude agreements like the one in Golden State.ss Although a line drawn at the commencement of litigation necessarily is somewhat arbitrary, it would prevent the most transparent attempts to circumvent Lear, without requiring courts in every case to evaluate the adequacy of consideration in terms of the credibility of threats of legal action or guesses about which party might prevail.
CONCLUSION
Although settlement agreements ordinarily are encouraged as a means of resolving legal disputes, the effect of attempting to compromise patent litigation by settlement currently is doubtful. The Supreme Court has adopted a theory of patent law that emphasizes the importance of litigation and the anticompetitive consequences of invalid patents, but it has never explicitly applied that theory to settlement agreements. 87 There is precedent for congressional action in this area. In 1976 a patent law revision bill containing an "anti-Lear" provision was passed by the Senate. S. 2255, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. § 296, 122 CONG. REc. 4507 (1976) . It was never enacted, however. " See text and notes at notes 45-50 supra.
As a theoretical matter, if the Supreme Court's premises are correct, perhaps settlement agreements should be discouraged. Or, if its premises are wrong, Lear, Inc. v. Adkins and related cases should be reexamined. The focus of this comment has not been on theory, however, but on practical concerns. In the absence of a clear legislative or judicial directive, courts should treat patent settlement agreements, at least where they are entered into after litigation has commenced, as they do other settlement agreements-as binding and enforceable contracts.
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